

UNDERTAKING NON CONFORMITIES (UNCs)

NOTIFICATI DA EASA A SEGUITO DELLA ISPEZIONE OPS.IT.04.2016

Requirement(s) ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)

Description Despite Operator adopting the EHEST SMS Toolkit for the identification and evaluation of aviation safety hazards and the management of the associated risks, they could not demonstrate which methodology they actually used. As an example, both the bow-tie and fish-bowl methodologies remained described in the Safety Management Manual, but no evidence of their use could be provided.

Requirement(s) ORO.GEN.200(a)(6)

Description Several checklists in use for compliance monitoring had not been updated to reflect the Air Operations Regulation (e.g. for training (CheckListPO.29) reference was still made to JAR-OPS 3 requirements). Therefore, the operator could not demonstrate compliance with all relevant requirements.

Requirement(s) ORO.FC.230

Description With regard to the recurrent training and checking programme, the operator could not demonstrate that:

- the aircraft/FSTD training programme was established in a way that all major failures of aircraft systems and associated procedures had been covered in the preceding 3 year period.
- the OPC contained all required abnormal/emergency procedures.

Furthermore, the HUET was not done every 3 years as part of the emergency and safety equipment training, and the security training was not done at intervals in accordance with the NASP.

Requirement(s) ORO.FC.230

Description For the helicopter operations, each flight crew member completed the operator proficiency checks (OPC) combined with the licence proficiency check (LPC) in the single-pilot role, whereas the normal operation was in a multi-pilot environment. Therefore the OPC was not performed as part of the normal crew complement. This was also contrary to Appendix 9 of Annex I to COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1178/2011. This Appendix requires the skill test for a multi-pilot aircraft to be performed in a multi-crew environment.



Requirement(s) ORO.GEN.200(a)(6)

Description The operator could not demonstrate how extensions to the due dates of 2 non-conformities were authorised by the compliance monitoring manager, i.a.w. their internal procedure.

Requirement(s) ORO.FC.230

Description For the helicopter operations, each flight crew member completed the operator proficiency checks (OPC) combined with the licence proficiency check (LPC) in the single-pilot role, whereas the normal operation was in a multi-pilot environment. Therefore the OPC was not performed as part of the normal crew complement. This was also contrary to Appendix 9 of Annex I to COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1178/2011. This Appendix requires the skill test for a multi-pilot aircraft to be performed in a multi-crew environment.

Requirement(s) ORO.FC.230

Description With regard to the recurrent training and checking programme, the operator could not demonstrate that:

- the aircraft/FSTD training programme was established in a way that all major failures of aircraft systems and associated procedures had been covered in the preceding 3 year period.
- the OPC contained all required abnormal/emergency procedures.

Requirement(s) ORO.MLR.100

Description The Operations Manual (OM) Part B limitations contained only a description of the certified limitations and did not include the applicable operational limitations, e.g. the operational limitation due to the absence of oxygen equipment was not included.

Requirement(s) ORO.FC.115

Description Reviewing the CRM training, it was identified that no detailed description of the CRM assessment was published in the operations manual to ensure uniform assessment of standards. Line checks were conducted by non-suitably qualified commanders as they were not trained in the assessment of CRM skills.



Requirement(s) ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)

Description The risk management process did not include verification of the effectiveness of mitigating actions taken.

Requirement(s) ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)

Description Operator's management of changes process had not been implemented when the nominated person for flight operations was changed.

Requirement(s) ORO.GEN.205

Description The operator could not demonstrate that all contracted services conformed to the applicable requirements (i.e. initial CRM training provider, FSTD provider).

Requirement(s) ORO.FC.115

Description No evidence of CRM assessment during line checks could be provided. Line checks were conducted by non-suitably qualified commanders as they were not trained in the operators' methods for the assessment of CRM skills.

Requirement(s) ORO.MLR.100

Description Operations manual contained incorrect and contradicting information (e.g. different description of the 'emergency fuel' and different cabin crew composition). In several cases the content was not customised.

Requirement(s)

Description The aircraft FSTD differences were not described in accordance with the Air Transport Association (ATA) chapters and the level of training required for such differences was not defined.